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This paper explores the role of political stability on fiscal policy choices in a time-series ana-
lysis over 158 years on the Swiss federal level. We argue that the fiscal-commons problem of 
public finances is affected by the time-horizon of a finance minister. Arguably, the incentives 
for an incumbent to maintain a good reputation with sound policy decisions are stronger the 
longer the time-horizon of a respective term. In addition, a finance minister who succeeds to 
stay a long time in office normally enjoys a politically powerful position towards the parlia-
ment, the administration and the interest groups to influence policy decisions. In contrast, fre-
quent government turnover weakens the position of the finance minister. 
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1.  Introduction 
In 1918, Schumpeter (1918, [1953], p. 5) contended that people’s nature, its cultural achieve-
ments, social structure, and what their countries’ policies offer could be read from its fiscal hi-
story.
1 Fiscal policy appeared to him as the best expression of world history. Since this publi-
cation, public choice analysis and political economics have followed his suggestions, though 
more often unconsciously than deliberately, to investigate how constitutional frameworks, in-
stitutional environments and political events influence fiscal policy in different countries. For 
example, Peacock and Wiseman (1961) studied the impact of wars (and other deep crises) on 
government growth and argued for the existence of a displacement effect. While tax resistan-
ce before a crisis prevents politicians from extending the state’s grip on the economy, a crisis 
reduces this resistance because taxpayers accept the necessity to raise government resources 
to overcome a critical situation. After the crisis, taxpayers have gotten accustomed to the in-
creased tax burden and the government is not compelled to reduce its activities to the level 
prevailing before the outbreak of the crisis. Similar to wars, the Great Depression served such 
a purpose and allowed for the extension of social welfare states in many Western societies 
(see Wallis 2000 for the U.S.). In the U.S., this even led to a revision in the basic structures of 
American federalism (Wallis 1991).  
The political economy of government size (Tridimas and Winer 2005) attributes the factors 
shaping fiscal policy to the demand and supply side. Thus, Peacock and Wiseman’s (1961) 
displacement effect results from an extraordinary demand for government expenditure during 
a crisis. Lott and Kenny’s (1999) analysis underlines the importance of changes in the demand 
for income redistribution and is thus in line with the Meltzer-Richard (1981) model. Si-
milarly, the classical studies by Wagner (1892) and Brecht (1932) emphasize income and ur-
banization, respectively, as determinants of the demand for government activity. Concerning 
the supply side, the relative productivity of public services as a reason for the “cost disease” 
(Baumol 1967), the inherent desire of Leviathan governments to exploit citizens (Brennan and 
Buchanan 1980), and partisan influences (Hibbs 1977, Blais, Blake and Dion 1993) provide 
grounds for a relative increase in government activity.  
However, as Tridimas and Winer (2005) or Besley and Case (2003) emphasize, these approa-
ches somewhat ignore the impact of constitutional and institutional structures on fiscal policy 
                                                  
1.  The original quote goes back to the German sociologist Rudolf Goldscheid who argued that “The budget is 
the skeleton of the state stripped of all misleading ideologies”.    – 3 –
outcomes.
2 Only recently have the constitutional differences between majoritarian and pro-
portional representation systems or between presidential and parliamentarian systems (Pers-
son and Tabellini 2000, 2003, Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti and Rostagno 2002), but also those bet-
ween direct and representative democracies (Feld and Kirchgässner 2001a, Feld and Matsu-
saka 2003, Matsusaka 1995, 2004) been studied in comparative political economics. The star-
ting point is the fiscal commons problem that arises when political decision-makers in the le-
gislature or the executive provide benefits from public projects concentrated on particular 
groups of society while the costs of these projects are spread across the whole population 
through general taxation. This particular common pool problem has been known at least since 
the seminal work by Buchanan and Tullock (1962, chapters 10 and 11), but it could occur in 
different forms. While the U.S. discussion mainly pays attention to the effects of pork-barrel 
politics in legislatures on public spending (Weingast, Shepsle and Johnson 1981, Inman and 
Fitts 1990, Gilligan and Matsusaka 1995, 2002), the European discussion focuses on coalition 
or cabinet size of the executives as characteristics of a fiscal commons problem determining 
spending, budget deficits and public debt (Roubini and Sachs 1989a, 1989b, Kontopoulos and 
Perotti 1999, Volkerink and de Haan 2001, Perotti and Kontopoulos 2002). This distinct em-
phasis may be interpreted as a hint to the importance of the constitutional differences between 
majoritarian/presidential and proportional representation/parliamentarian systems.  
Comparing direct and representative democracies, Feld and Kirchgässner (2001a, 2001b), 
Feld and Matsusaka (2003), Feld, Schaltegger and Schnellenbach (2008) and Schaltegger and 
Feld (2009) argue (and present evidence for Switzerland) that the fiscal commons problem is 
less severe under direct democracy due to difficulties to organize log-rolling in referenda and 
initiatives. Their results of a lower level of public spending and of less centralized spending 
and revenue in direct democracies, which they obtain for a panel of the Swiss cantons be-
tween 1980 and 1998, are supported by Funk and Gathmann (2007) in a larger panel of Swiss 
cantons between 1890 and 2000. These studies focus on fiscal policy of the Swiss cantons and 
how it is affected by fiscal referenda. Fiscal policy at the Swiss federal level is however sel-
dom analyzed. Only the works by Gebhard Kirchgässner stand out. For example, Kirchgäss-
ner and Prohl (2008) provide a time series analysis of federal fiscal policy in Switzerland 
from 1900 to 2002. Their main concern is the sustainability of federal fiscal policy. There is 
also an earlier time series analysis by Kirchgässner and Pommerehne (1997) for all three go-
                                                  
2.  Tridimas and Winer (2005) underline the additional importance of political influence without discussing 
however constitutional or institutional structures either.    – 4 –
vernment levels in Switzerland and for Germany from 1961 to 1987. They include political 
variables in addition to characteristics of demand and supply for government activity and so-
cio-demographic controls. However, they do not look at institutional factors such as propor-
tional representation or direct democracy and the time period they study is too short to investi-
gate short-run and long-run effects in a differentiated way.
3  
This paper contributes to the political economy of fiscal policy using time series data for the 
Swiss federal level. In contrast to previous analyses, the data set extends from the creation of 
the Swiss constitution in 1849 until 2007. It thus covers the full time period with many histo-
rical events that need to be captured in addition to economic and socio-demographic factors. 
Moreover, the long time series allows us to investigate potential short-run and long-run rela-
tions between the economic and fiscal variables. Our main research interest, however, consists 
in testing the hypothesis whether political stability induces sound fiscal policies in the long-
run. Political stability is mainly captured by the time horizon of the finance minister, but is 
evaluated against the background of exogenous shocks like the two world wars or the Great 
Depression and constitutional changes like the switch to proportional electoral representation.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2, the impact of political stabi-
lity on fiscal policy outcomes and how it is achieved under different constitutional regimes 
are discussed. The empirical strategy follows in section 3. The results will be discussed in 
section 4 while section 5 offers some concluding remarks.  
2.  Long-term political stability and fiscal policy: Some theoretical considerations 
Starting from Buchanan’s and Tullock’s (1962) perspective of the fiscal commons problem, 
fiscal policy results from a differential success of societal groups which reap particular bene-
fits from public policy, but spread its costs broadly over the whole population through general 
taxes. The core element of the fiscal commons problem is the notion of targeted spending and 
general taxes. As the marginal costs of each spending project are lower than the marginal be-
nefits for the individuals in groups which are particularly privileged, these groups demand hi-
gher than socially optimal spending. Government activity is consequently extended beyond its 
optimal scope. It should, however, be noticed that this exploitation of those not participating 
                                                  
3.  See also Kirchgässner and Pommerehne (1988) for a detailed analysis of fiscal developments in Switzerland. 
There is an earlier study by Meier et al. (1973), which uses time series of revenue, spending and federal 
grants from 1950 – 1969 for all three government levels, but their focus is on income, inflation and popula-
tion size. In addition to the recent panel studies on cantonal fiscal policy, there are of course several earlier 
papers like the one by Hauser et al. (1975) using cantonal cross section data, or the ones by Pommerehne and 
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in log-rolling arrangements, which bestow a privileged access to the fiscal commons, is 
generally restricted by a membership externality which stems from the intersection of mem-
bers among separate majority coalitions (Buchanan and Yoon 2004). 
The fiscal commons problem is affected by different constitutional systems. The argument is 
that majoritarian electoral systems strengthen the accountability of representatives in contrast 
to proportional electoral systems, where the link between the electorate and the representative 
is much looser. In majoritarian systems, each representative in the legislature thus aims at en-
suring re-election in his constituency by providing benefits from federal spending projects to 
his district. Only a part of the legislature will be successful in bringing home such funds. The 
successful incumbents exchange votes according to a log-rolling arrangement resulting in 
pork-barrel politics (Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen 1981). Such log-rolling arrangements are 
particularly successful in presidential regimes as legislators are less disciplined by partisan 
considerations. In parliamentary democracies, parties gain more importance as the govern-
ment depends on a confidence vote of the different fractions in parliament. The argument is 
one of weak checks and balances. Parties must ensure their majority and ascertain a stronger 
independence from pork-barreling. In a parliamentary system with proportional representa-
tion, the fiscal commons problem occurs more directly and explicitly in the executive. Due to 
proportional representation, a parliament with more than two parties becomes highly proba-
ble, such that coalitions between parties must often be built to form a government. Log-rolling 
is then explicitly achieved in a coalition contract (Roubini and Sachs 1989a, 1989b). Similar 
considerations obtain when different wings of a large party gain ministerial representation in 
government (Perotti and Kontopoulos 2002).  
In sum the traditional fiscal commons problem occurs with respect to public spending and 
subsequently public revenue. In more recent times, the role a fiscal commons problem plays 
in explaining the increasing indebtedness in OECD countries is additionally emphasized (von 
Hagen and Harden 1995, Velasco 1999, 2000, Volkerink and de Haan 2001). The same me-
chanism could be described with the further complication of spreading the costs of concentra-
ted spending projects not only to the current, but also to future taxpayers. The exploitation of 
the fiscal commons then implies excessive debt.  
Several solutions to fiscal commons problems are discussed in the literature. Most prominent-
ly formal fiscal rules restrain overspending and excessive debts.
4 Moreover, budgetary proce-
                                                  
4.  See Poterba (1997) or Kirchgässner (2002) for surveys on the effects of fiscal institutions on fiscal policy, 
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dures may constrain public debt (von Hagen 1992, Hallerberg and von Hagen 1999, Haller-
berg, Strauch and von Hagen 2007). In these analyses, the role of an agenda setter in the bud-
getary process, e.g. the finance minister, is emphasized. By coordinating the proposals of the 
different spending ministers, such a central player is able to reduce the fiscal commons prob-
lem if budgetary goals are tight and strictly enforced. From that perspective the fiscal com-
mons problem is a particular kind of government weakness which finds its expression in dif-
ferent forms of fragmentation from large coalitions and cabinets to pork-barrel spending and 
divided government (Alt and Lowry 1994, Alesina and Rosenthal 1996).
5 Fiscal policy under 
such a severe threat of common pool problems lacks the intertemporal reliability which is im-
portant for private actors in taking their economic dispositions. An institutionally strong fi-
nance minister thus helps to establish political reliability and stability. Institutional strength of 
the finance minister could be established by different measures, for example a right to veto 
the budget law, as in Germany, or the right to set pre-specified spending targets.  
In addition to institutional strength, government stability, i.e. when a finance minister suc-
ceeds in remaining in office for longer time horizons, can reduce the fiscal commons problem. 
Arguably, the incentives for an incumbent to maintain a good reputation with sound policy 
decisions are stronger the longer the time-horizon. In addition, a finance minister who suc-
ceeds in staying a long time in office usually enjoys a politically powerful position towards 
the parliament, the administration and the interest groups. In contrast, frequent government 
turnover weakens the position of the finance minister. A long time-horizon on the job vests 
such a person with a natural advantage with respect to spending ministers who have a lower 
tenure. Moreover, as Besley and Case (1995) argue, a longer time horizon provides the incen-
tives to build reputation in office. The reputation gained as a finance minister may boost her 
prospects for becoming prime minister or head of state or, after finishing the term, pursuing a 
career in the private sector. Career concerns could thus provide for beneficial incentives. This 
also holds if the reputation accumulated in office promotes someone’s career in the private 
sector. While Besley and Case (1995) underline the detrimental effects of term limits when 
career concerns play a role, De Haan and Sturm (1994) emphasize the importance of the fre-
quency with which government changes for the growth in public debt. In any case, factual 
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government stability is arguably important for sound fiscal policies. We thus have a closer 
look on government stability in an institutionally strong polity, namely in Switzerland. 
3.  Empirical strategy 
In order to investigate the impact of political stability on fiscal policy, we conduct a time se-
ries analysis for the Swiss federal level over a long time horizon between 1849, i.e. one year 
after the foundation of the Swiss Confederation, to 2007 which is the year in which the Swiss 
debt brake is supposed to work without qualifications. Our data set thus covers the whole time 
period for which Switzerland has existed as a Confederation. Choosing the Swiss federal level 
for such an investigation is natural as the political system slowly evolved without being de-
ranged by major constitutional eruptions or revolutions, but still exhibits several important 
constitutional and political changes. More importantly, the federal government consists of a 
coalition between the same four parties since 1959. In this respect, Switzerland is the country 
with the highest degree of political stability in Europe.  
In one of the previously conducted time series analyses for Switzerland from 1961 to 1987, 
Kirchgässner and Pommerehne (1997) study Swiss (and German) fiscal policy by starting 
from an Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) as their econometric approach. This notwith-
standing they are forced to estimate reduced form models owing to the prevailing simultaneity 
between public spending, revenue and budget surplus. The simultaneity in fiscal policy deci-
sions prevents them from imposing meaningful exclusion restrictions such that the structural 
form of the model cannot be identified. In another time series analysis for the Swiss federal 
level from 1900 to 2002, Kirchgässner and Prohl (2008) conduct unit root, stationarity and co-
integration tests as well as tests on structural breaks to investigate the sustainability of fiscal 
policy. While the structural break they find for the Second World War underlines the influ-
ence of particular exogenous events on fiscal policy, the authors are subsequently only intere-
sted in the sustainability question. According to their results, Swiss fiscal policy has been 
(weakly) sustainable for the whole time period and for the sub-period since 1946.
6  
As we are more interested in the effect of political and constitutional factors on fiscal policy 
than on sustainability of fiscal policy, we propose the following reduced form model:  
Xt = β0 + β1 CTRLt-1 +β2 Political Stabilityt-1 +β3 Constitutional Changest + Trend + εt, (1) 
                                                  
6.  Similarly, Afonso and Rault (2008) investigate fiscal sustainability in the EU using stationarity and coin-
tegration analysis. They conclude that overall, fiscal policy in the EU15 has been sustainable during the 
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where t are the year indices. X represents the budget variables, i.e. budget surplus, public debt, 
public spending or revenue, each normalized by GDP. In addition to the time trend which is 
included in each regression, the vector of economic controls (CTRL), lagged by one period, 
consists of the oil price, real GDP, nominal interest rates and population size. Unfortunately, 
data on other structural variables, like age of population, the share of urban population or the 
unemployment rate are not available or are not consistently measured over this long time 
period. Real GDP is included to capture potential income effects of the demand for public 
goods. Population size controls for the extent of publicness of government spending due to 
non-rivalness in consumption and is thus included. The oil price is supposed to proxy supply 
shocks. Nominal interest rates are included to capture business cycle effects.  
With respect to public spending and revenue, we expect GDP to exert a positive influence fol-
lowing Wagner’s (1896) arguments. Population size is supposed to have a negative influence 
on spending per capita if Samuelson’s (1954) theory on public goods holds true. A simple po-
litico-economic argument, however, suggests the opposite sign. A larger population size im-
plies a broader tax base such that a Leviathan government could raise revenue. If the Peacock 
and Wiseman (1961) mechanism prevails, i.e. if the ability to extend public spending depends 
on revenue restrictions, higher spending might result from a larger population. The sign of 
this variable is thus theoretically indeterminate. Interest rates reflect the business cycle, and 
might be negatively associated with budget surpluses and positively with public debt.  
In addition to these economic variables, the model contains dummy variables capturing par-
ticular events in Swiss history which could be hypothesized to have affected fiscal policy. 
One dummy variable takes on the value of 1, and zero otherwise, for the years of the two 
world wars between 1914/18 and 1939/45 and the German-French-War in 1870/71. Another 
dummy variable takes on the value of one for the time of the Great Depression between 1929 
and 1933. Furthermore, the years with major tax amnesties on the federal level in 1940, 1945 
and 1969, years for which a federal income tax was levied (1916, 1917, 1921, 1924, 1925, 
1928, 1929, 1932, 1940-2007) and the drastic devaluation of the Swiss franc in 1936 are con-
trolled for. Moreover, dummy variables which mark the shift from a majoritarian to a pro-
portional representation system in 1919, the creation of the Swiss National Bank (SNB) in 
1907 and of the federal old age pension system (AHV) in 1948 are included in the model.  
With respect to these variables, and following the analysis by Peacock and Wiseman (1961), 
we could hypothesize an unambiguously positive effect of the two world wars on public ex-
penditure and revenue as well as on debt, but a negative effect on the budgetary surplus. In   – 9 –
addition, we expect the introduction of the AHV to increase public spending, revenue and 
debt. It indicates the new era of the welfare state in Switzerland and thus exemplifies the de-
mand for income redistribution as suggested by Meltzer and Richard (1981). Also, following 
Persson and Tabellini (2000), the switch from a majoritarian system to proportional represen-
tation supposedly increases spending, deficits and debt.  
While additional instruments of direct democracy were introduced at the federal level since 
the foundation of the Swiss Confederation, direct democracy is controlled for by the number 
of referenda and initiatives, lagged by one period as well as a one period lag of voter turnout. 
According to the partisan theory, ideological dispositions are often supposed to affect fiscal 
policy as well (Hibbs 1977, Blais, Blake and Dion 1993). In particular, left-wing parties are 
assumed to favor a larger public sector and incur higher indebtedness. In our econometric mo-
del, ideology is captured for the executive by including a dummy variable adopting the value 
of one if a Social Democratic finance minister was in office and zero otherwise. In addition, 
the influence of the SPS is measured by the share of its seats in the national parliament. Both 
variables are lagged by one period. Although the Social Democrats are usually hypothesized 
to favor a larger public sector, it should also be noted that the rise of the Social Democratic 
Party marks a boost of political competition at the federal level. In the beginning of the Con-
federation, federal politics was dominated by the (then largely protestant) Free Democratic 
Party (FDP). Its main political competitor, the (then largely catholic) Christian Democratic 
Party (CVP) entered the federal government in the end of the 19
th century in 1891. But both 
parties represented groups of the population which were more or less conservative. They 
could be expected to both favor conservative fiscal policies, but thus also to target spending to 
their clienteles. The rise of social democrats, in particular before the Second World War, 
threatened the rents of the CVP and the FDP obtained from the public budget. As long as the 
SPS was not included in the federal government (until 1943), the political competition which 
was triggered by its rise could have led to a reduction in rents and possibly also spending. As 
a part of the governing coalition, it could be expected that the additional party in government 
increased spending because of the fiscal commons problem.  
Political stability, as the final variable included in the analysis, has a particular meaning in 
this paper. It is measured by the time horizon of the finance minister. The measure is con-
structed retrospectively adopting a value of one in the first year of a finance minister and then 
counting continuously to the end of his term. Following the combined arguments by Besley 
and Case (1995) and the fiscal commons literature, a longer time in office provides a finance   – 10 –
minister with incentives to perform well due to career concerns. The longer he is in office, the 
more experience will help him to enforce budgetary goals against the different spending mini-
sters. Arguably, the incentives for an incumbent to maintain a good reputation with sound po-
licy decisions are stronger the longer the time horizon of a respective term. In addition, a fi-
nance minister who succeeds in staying a long time in office normally enjoys a politically po-
werful position towards the parliament, the administration and the lobbies to influence policy 
decisions. In contrast, frequent government turnover weakens the position of the finance mini-
ster. We thus expect this variable to exert a positive effect on budget surpluses and a negative 
effect on public debt as well as on spending and revenue.  
Political stability in this context does not mean the lack of exogenous shocks or the lack of 
coups and revolutions. With respect to the former, important exogenous shocks like the wars 
or the Great Depression could of course be observed in the time period covered by our data 
set. Regarding the latter, no coup or revolution took place in Switzerland. Since 1959, Swi-
tzerland experiences even an extraordinary degree of political stability in the sense that the 
government consists of the same four coalition partners. This system also allows a finance mi-
nister to stay in office without being much threatened by elections. He has a relatively high 
degree of discretion as to whether he wants to stay, to become minister in another ministry or 
to retire. Infrequently, Swiss finance ministers are forced to step down by their party or by po-
litical (and legal) scandals. The perspective adopted here is thus on the personality of the fi-
nance minister. It is a particular form of political leadership we are interested in.  
The test strategy followed in this paper is straightforward. First, the time series characteristics 
of the data set are investigated by conducting unit root and cointegration tests. Tests on struc-
tural breaks are not conducted as they are well documented in the paper by Kirchgässner and 
Prohl (2008) for the Second World War. Moreover, several less important breaks are covered 
by different dummy variables in the reduced form regressions. Depending on the unit root and 
cointegration tests, the final models for the four dependent budgetary variables are specified. 
In any case, given the structural break induced by the Second World War, these analyses are 
conducted for the whole sample and the two sub-samples before and after the war excluding 
these war years. For the two sub-samples, some exogenous variables may be meaningless, e.g. 
if a particular event did not occur in the sub-period, and are then excluded.    – 11 –
4.  Results 
Anecdotal evidence 
A first look at Swiss federal fiscal policy since 1849 already reveals interesting patterns. From 
the foundation of the constitution until the first integral revision of the constitution in 1874, 
the federal level carried a relatively light fiscal burden. The government was mainly concer-
ned with the formation of a federal army and the construction of a federal infrastructure to 
promote mobility and education. The source of income consisted of customs and excise du-
ties. Usually, the federal budget was balanced in the first 30 years with the exception of extra-
ordinarily high spending during the German-French-War in 1870/71. From 1874 to 1914 the 
federal government gained new competencies from the cantons in the sense of Popitz’ Law 
(1927). For example, the nationalization of formerly private railway companies to the Schwei-
zerische Bundesbahnen SBB, the formation of a central bank (the SNB), laws to subsidize 
education and farmers, the construction of alpine roads and some inchoate social security 
transfer programs. Since the upgrading of government tasks at the federal level was not follo-
wed by new tax sources, the federal government warned the parliament repeatedly against the 
introduction of new spending proposals – with mixed success. Until the eve of the First World 
War, the federal government nevertheless conducted a relatively sound fiscal policy (Weber, 
1969). Neither do budget surpluses (in percent of GDP) exhibit important turns into the nega-
tive (Figure 1), nor does public debt (in percent of GDP) reveal any boost or much volatility 
(Figure 2). In the second half of the 19
th century, the Swiss Confederation appears to be a dif-
ferent one from today. However, it should be noted that a slightly increasing trend in the debt 
ratio could already be observed. Similarly, federal expenditure (Figure 3) and revenue (Figu-
re 4), both in percent of GDP, indicate similar increasing trends in public sector activity. Ad-
mittedly, the level of relative public sector size on the federal level was still well below 10%. 
During World War I, government finances ran into huge deficits. This was the result of extra-
ordinarily high military spending as well as falling government revenue due to drastically de-
creasing customs duties. Though the government introduced a federal income and wealth tax 
in 1915, additional revenue was not raised until 1916/17 and was small in amount. Thus, Swi-
tzerland was defraying the financial burden of World War I with debt (government bonds) 
and the seignorage from the Swiss National Bank SNB. After World War I, government spen-
ding was not immediately cut back to the initial level and the creation of new taxes was veto-
ed by public referenda. Thus, public finances recovered only slowly. In autumn 1929, federal 
government finances were hit anew by the onset of the Great Depression. The government   – 12 –
answered with the implementation of a “deflation-policy”. This policy resulted in severe eco-
nomic and social turbulences which culminated in 1936, when the government had to deva-
luate the national currency Swiss Franc by 30% (Weber, 1969). All in all, the First World War 
led to a remarkable change inducing a first noticeable federal budget deficit of 4% of GDP in 
1915 and leading to stronger shifts in spending and revenue although Switzerland was not 
actively involved in the war. These unexpected deficits of the war period led to an increase in 
federal debt to 31% in 1922, before larger surpluses reversed that development during the 
years 1924 to 1937 (including the great depression). 
In 1938, a “sales-tax” was introduced on the federal level due to financial needs of the upco-
ming World War II. In contrast to World War I, the government wanted to be prepared this ti-
me. However, the federal council was only partially successful. The reintroduction of a fede-
ral income tax, changes in stamp duties and the introduction of a balanced-budget-rule were 
vetoed in parliament. Despite all the preparations by the government, the financial burden of 
World War II went far beyond the scope of World War I. In 1940, the government made use 
of its extended constitutional powers and introduced several new taxes together with a tax 
amnesty. 29% of all extraordinary military spending were covered by the additional revenues 
(Weber, 1969). During the Second World War, again the budget deficits, spending and re-
venue increased tremendously which led to big increases in federal debt. In 1941, the federal 
budget deficit amounted to 13% of GDP. Federal spending rose from 5.5% in 1937 to 18.6% 
in 1944. Federal debt consequently rose from 27.4% in 1937 to 63.2% in 1944.  
The period after the war brought a time of fiscal consolidation at the federal level. From 1946 
to 1970, only in the three years 1951, 1952 and 1967 could small budget deficits of 0.13 to 
0.88% of GDP be observed. Federal debt was reduced to 7% of GDP in 1969. However, the 
growth in federal spending and revenue continued after the war. Like Peacock and Wiseman 
(1961) argued, federal spending and revenue did not come back to the same relative size of 
the years before the war and subsequently rose at an accelerated pace, notwithstanding small 
ups and downs triggered by economic activity.  
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Term episodes of incumbents along deficit to GDP 
Hans Streuli, 
term: 1954-1959
E rnst Wetter, 
term 1938-1943
 
The development of government finances after 1960 was characterized by two trends: a first 
wave of government expansion was accompanied by good economic conditions so that public 
finances could be held more or less balanced even during the oil crises. The second wave of 
government expansion occurred during the 1990s and was accompanied by an economic 
downswing and relatively high rates of unemployment which ended at the beginning of the 
21
st century. Additionally, in 1995 the VAT was introduced at the federal level which expan-
ded the revenue capacity of the federal government considerably compared to the former sales 
tax. In 2001 voters agreed in a referendum to a balanced-budget-rule aimed to fight continued 
deficit spending (Frey, 2007). 
Regarding the performance of each individual minister of finance, Figure 5, Figure 6 and 
Appendix C illustrate their relative success with respect to federal budget surpluses and fede-
ral spending. It certainly is a bad coincidence that Giuseppe Motta and Ernst Wetter served as 
federal finance ministers during the First and Second World War, respectively. Unsurprising-
ly, their performance appears to be the worst in terms of average budget deficits and spending 
growth. Motta, who served from 1912 to 1919 as minister of finance, increased federal spen-
ding by 1.8% on average per year and presented budget deficits of 2.32% on average. Federal 
debt thus increased during his time in office by 17.43 percentage points. In his term between   – 16 –
1938 and 1943, Wetter had to bear federal deficits of 8.3% of GDP on average per year. Fede-
ral debt rose by 23.54 percentage points during this time.  
Jean-Marie Musy served from 1919 to 1934 and thus the longest time as federal finance mini-
ster. Overall, his performance with respect to fiscal policy is relatively good.
7 He stressed the 
importance of a balanced budget and the stability of the Swiss franc. He reduced federal spen-
ding in percent of GDP by 1.18 percentage points, on average presented an almost balanced 
budget of –0.02% and moderately increased federal debt (in percent of GDP) by 3.27 percen-
tage points. The first social democratic finance minister was Ernst Nobs between 1944 and 
1951 who could also offer a good performance favored by the postwar consolidation mood. 
He reduced public debt in percent of GDP by 28.83 percentage points overall.  
Figure 6: Average Change in Federal Expenditure, in % of GDP , for Swiss 


































































































































































































Term episodes of incumbents along spending to GDP 
Ernst Nobs,
term: 1944-1951
E rnst Wetter, 
term 1938-1943
 
Results from Unit Root Tests and Cointegration Tests 
Of course the anecdotal evidence can only illustrate the development of Swiss federal fiscal 
policy and the performance of the finance minister. A more rigorous analysis must be conduc-
ted to test the hypothesis on political stability and sound public finances. A first step towards 
                                                  
7.  More debated is his role during World War II: Musy was close to fascist ideas and had connections to impor-
tant persons of the NSDAP. However, as a private person without political or diplomatic status, he helped to 
rescue 1200 Jews from the KZ Theresienstadt into Switzerland.   – 17 –
a serious analysis consists in the elaboration of the time series characteristics of the main fis-
cal policy variables (Kirchgässner and Wolters 2007). First, tests for unit roots are presented 
in order to test on the stationarity of fiscal policy at the federal level. We conduct Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests and Philipps-Perron (PP) tests, but abstained from also presenting 
the KPSS tests. The ADF and PP tests for the whole sample are much in line with the results 
of Kirchgässner and Prohl (2008) such that the KPSS test results would not have provided 
further insights in order to proceed in our analysis.  
Table 1     Test for Unit Roots, Swiss Federal Level, 1849 – 2007  
Variables ADF  test  Philipps-Perron (PP) test 










1849 – 2007 
Budget Surplus (in % of GDP)  -4.036** -5.610**  -11.423**  -4.425**  -4.419**  -11.377** 
Public Debt (in % of GDP)   -1.185 -2.438  -7.631**  -1.597  -1.854  -7.555** 
Expenditure (in % of GDP)  -1.507  -4.648** -8.555**  -1.990  -3.388(*)  -8.656** 
Revenue (in % of GDP)  -1.571  -4.085** -19.539**  -1.252  -4.547**  -19.100** 
1849 – 1939 
Budget Surplus (in % of GDP)  -2.836(*) -3.109  -7.852**  -2.888(*)  -3.036  -7.801** 
Public Debt (in % of GDP)   -0.882 -2.022 -5.841** 0.285  -1.542  -5.753** 
Expenditure (in % of GDP)  -1.061  -3.633*  -7.382**  -0.939  -3.269(*) -7.330** 
Revenue (in % of GDP)  -1.388  -2.962 -7.924** -0.985  -3.974**  -7.382** 
1946 – 2007 
Budget Surplus (in % of GDP)  -3.469* -3.506* -11.558** -3.381*  -3.923*  -11.631** 
Public Debt (in % of GDP)   -4.106** -3.554*  -7.066**  -3.780**  -3.633*  -7.051** 
Expenditure (in % of GDP)  -2.086  -5.061** -9.376**  -2.332 -6.192**  -7.330** 
Revenue (in % of GDP)  -2.197  -2.933 -18.003**  -1.607  -4.823**  -16.075** 
The values are the estimated t-statistics. ‘**’, ‘*’ or ‘(*)’ indicate that the null hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected at the 
1, 5, or 10 percent level, respectively. The number of lags of the ADF tests has been determined using the Hannan-Quinn 
criterion. For the Philipps-Perron tests always 4 lags have been used. 
 
As Table 1 indicates, the hypothesis of a unit root in levels can be rejected for the federal bud-
get surplus in percent of GDP for the whole time period from 1849 to 2007 on the one percent 
significance level, but also for the two sub-periods, 1849 to 1939 and 1946 to 2007, at the ten 
and five percent levels respectively. This holds irrespective of which test, the ADF or the PP 
test, is used. While the result for the whole time period is in line with that of Kirchgässner and   – 18 –
Prohl (2008), the results for the sub-periods are stronger. In addition, the hypothesis of a unit 
root can be rejected for the level of federal debt in percent of GDP in the sub-period 1946 to 
2007. Otherwise, the test statistics indicate that only first differences are stationary. In par-
ticular for federal spending and revenue, the hypothesis of a unit root in the levels could never 
be rejected for any period. However, as the results for the ADF-test as well as the PP-test 
suggest, government spending and revenue seem to be trend stationary. In the case for go-
vernment debt, at least the period after World War II is trend stationary.  
Table 2     Results of the Engle-Granger Cointegration Test, Swiss Federal Level, 1849 – 2007  
  Cointegrating equation  Residual regression 
Dependent Variable  Coefficient
(S.E.) 
R
2  ADF 
statistic 
PP statistic 
1849 – 2007 
Expenditure-GDP-ratio  1.100 
(0.03) 




Revenue-GDP-ratio  0.789 
(0.02) 
0.868  -5.897** 
 
-6.027** 
1849 – 1939 
Expenditure-GDP-ratio  0.901 
(0.07) 
0.643 -4.720**  -4.789** 
Revenue-GDP-ratio  0.714 
(0.06) 
0.643 -5.432**  -5.395** 
1946 – 2007 
Expenditure-GDP-ratio  1.083 
(0.08) 
0.760 -5.798**  -5.965** 
Revenue-GDP-ratio  0.701 
(0.05) 
0.760 -5.326**  -5.250** 
 ‘**’, ‘*’ or ‘(*)’ indicate that the null hypothesis of no cointegration can be rejected at the 1, 5, or 10 percent level, 
respectively. For the ADF tests 1 lag has always been used. For the Philipps-Perron tests always 4 lags have been used. The 
critical values for the ADF- and the PP-statistics of expenditure and revenue to GDP rations are -3.491 for the 1 percent 
level, -2.886 for the 5 percent level and -2.576 for the 10 percent level.  
Given that the levels of budget surpluses in percent of GDP are I(0) and of the federal debt 
ratio is I(1) for the whole time period and before the Second World War, one of the usual tests 
for sustainability, namely that deficits and debt are cointegrated, would not make sense and 
could not serve as a help for our subsequent econometric specification. Thus, only tests on co-
integration of federal spending and revenue are performed as they are difference stationary 
with the same order of integration. Table 2 presents the results of the residual based Engle-
Granger test for cointegration. The ADF test of the residuals for the whole time period gives a   – 19 –
t-statistic of 5.9 which is significant at the 1 percent level. This indicates that federal revenue 
and expenditure in percent of GDP are cointegrated for the whole time period. Similarly high 
t-statistics for the two sub-periods could be observed such that cointegration between federal 
spending and revenue prevails consistently. Again our results for the sub-periods are stronger 
than those presented by Kirchgässner and Prohl (2008). 
Table 3     Results of the Johansen Cointegration Test, Swiss Federal Level, 1849 – 2007  
Eigenvalue  Null hypothesis  Lags  Trace statistic 
1849 – 2007 
0.145  r = 0  4  24.60** 
0.002  r = 1  4  0.25 
1849 – 1939 
0.050  r = 0  4  4.55* 
0.002  r = 1  4  0.18 
1946 – 2007 
0.260  r = 0  4  21.51** 
0.050  r = 1  4  3.13 
 ‘**’ or ‘*’ indicate that the null hypothesis of no cointegration can be rejected at the 1 or 5 percent level, respectively.  
Finally, we use the Johansen multivariate cointegration test in order to determine the number 
of cointegrating vectors in the system. We perform the trace test only and assume the existen-
ce of a constant in the error correction term. Table 3 shows the results for the whole sample 
and the two sub-samples. The null hypothesis of no cointegration can be rejected for the who-
le time period and for the sub-period from 1946 to 2007 on the 1 percent level as well as for 
the sub-period from 1849 to 1939 on the 5 percent significance level. These results support 
the previous findings and the hypothesis that federal spending and revenue are cointegrated. 
Multivariate analysis 
For the multivariate analysis, these clear-cut results suggest the following strategy. As the fe-
deral budget surplus in percent of GDP is stationary for the whole time period and both sub-
periods, the model formulated before is estimated by OLS. As we could not establish any co-
integrating relation between the federal debt ratio and economic or fiscal variables and as the 
federal debt ratio is even stationary for the time after the Second World War, the model is 
again estimated by OLS. In the case of federal debt to GDP, regressions for the levels and the 
first differences are presented. In both sets of regressions capturing indebtedness, the results 
including a one period lagged endogenous variable are presented.    – 20 –
Table 4: Results for Federal Budget Surplus, in % of GDP, 1849-2007 
Variables  Budget Surplus in % of GDP 
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t-1 










































Constant  1.430 1.430 1.447 1.656 0.391  0.344 
Observations  158  158  158  158  144  136 
R
2 0.720  –  0.809  0.413  0.580  0.488 
D.W. (transformed)  1.285  –  1.855  1.951  1.853  1.804 
F-Test –  13.10**  –  –  –  – 
RMSE  0.011    0.009  0.010  0.052  0.0050 
S.W.  for  normal  data  8.084** 8.084** 8.432** 7.230** 5.376**  4.906** 
Note: The numbers in parentheses are the absolute values of the estimated t-statistics. ‘***’, ‘**’, ‘*’ or ‘(*)’ show 
that the estimated parameter is significantly different from zero at the 0.1, 1, 5, or 10 percent level, respectively. 
RMSE is the root mean squared error, and D.W. is the value of the Durbin-Watson statistic on autocorrelation of 
the residuals. S.W. displays the Shapiro-Wilk test for normal data.    – 21 –
Table 5: Results for Federal Debt, in % of GDP, 1849-2007 
Variables  Public Debt in % of GDP 

















































Wars   4.548** 
(5.18) 
– – 3.625** 
(4.30) 
– – 
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Constant -2.206  -0.715  -1.055 -0.490 -0.357  -0.272 
Observations  158  144  136  157  143  135 
R
2  0.985  0.985  0.985 0.500 0.464  0.442 
D.W. (transformed)  1.829  1.963  1.982  2.083  2.105  2.064 
RMSE  0.018  0.016  0.016 0.018 0.015  0.016 
S.W. for normal data  5.919**  5.889**  5.878**  4.795**  5.538**  5.718** 
For Notes see Table 4. Please note also that in the first difference equations the continuous explanatory variables 
are also in first differences.     – 22 –
Table 6: Error Correction Model for Federal Spending and Revenue, in % of GDP, 1849-2007 
Variables  First Difference in Expenditure  First Difference in Revenue 
  Full Sample  Without wars  Without wars, 
recession 
90/97 
Full Sample  Without wars  Without wars, 
recession 
90/97 




































Wars   0.013* 
(2.50) 
–  –  0.015* 
(2.00) 
–  – 
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Constant  -0.740  -0.347  -0.247  -0.923  -0.346  -0.486 
Observations 157  143 135 157 143 135 
R
2  0.646  0.615  0.611  0.491  0.548  0.560 
D.W. (transformed)  1.835  2.022 2.028 1.986 1.595 1.631 
RMSE  0.006  0.004  0.004  0.007  0.005  0.004 
S.W. for normal data  7.667**  8.574** 8.664** 5.297** 8.075** 8.151** 
For Notes see Table 4.   – 23 –
Table 7: Results for Federal Spending and Revenue, in % of GDP, 1849-2007 
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– – – – 
Revenue in % of 
GDP t-1 
–  –  –  –  0.486** 
(4.12) 
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Observations  158  158 158 158 158 158 
R
2  0.894  0.973  0.302  0.944  0.958  0.598 
D.W.  (transformed)  0.929  1.731 1.600 1.479 2.569 2.598 
RMSE  0.014  0.007  0.008  0.009  0.008  0.008 
S.W.  for  normal  data  3.889**  4.932** 5.736** 4.930** 5.132** 3.273** 
For Notes see Table 4.   – 24 –
With respect to federal spending in percent of GDP and federal revenue in percent of GDP, 
the existence of a cointegration relation allows us to estimate error correction models for the 
whole time period and the two sub-periods also investigating long-run and short-run effects of 
different variables. In comparison to that, we display also the results for spending and revenue 
levels since trend stationarity cannot be fully rejected.  
The results for the federal budget surplus in percent of GDP are presented in Table 4. The first 
column shows the results of our regression model with robust standard errors using the Hu-
ber-White sandwich correction and the second column the same model with a Newey-West 
correction of the standard errors. The Durbin Watson test statistics for the first regression in-
dicates the existence of autocorrelation of the residuals. The reaction of the standard errors to 
the Newey-West correction does so likewise. In the third column, the model including a lag-
ged endogenous variable is presented, while the AR(1) regression is shown in the fourth co-
lumn. In the fifth and sixth columns we exclude the time period of wars and additionally of 
the recession period during the 1990s (1990-1997) from the sample to control for outliers (see 
the Shapiro-Wilk-Test for normal data). Overall, across these specifications, the structure of 
the estimation results remains relatively robust. Given the strong autocorrelation of the resi-
duals, the much stronger variation in significances does not surprise.  
Focusing on the regression with a lagged endogenous variable in column 3, it becomes ob-
vious that the federal budget surplus ratio is mainly determined by particular shocks, but also 
by political factors. The two world wars together with the German-French-War, as expected 
from the descriptive analysis, strongly and significantly reduce the budget surplus, while the 
devaluation of the Swiss franc increased the federal surplus. Both variables are significant on 
the 1 percent level. A larger number of seats in parliament for the social democrats signifi-
cantly increase the federal budget surplus (at the 1 percent level), though this might be the 
luck of social democratic finance ministers being in office directly after the Second World 
War. Party affiliation seems to play a role in the federal council, too, even though there is not 
much variation in the data. As expected, a longer time horizon of the finance minister has also 
a positive sign and is significant at the 5 percent level for the whole time period. Regarding 
the two sub-periods, these results largely remain robust. While the time horizon of the finance 
minister keeps its significantly positive sign after excluding observations for the periods of 
the German-French-War, the First World War and the Second World War, it falls to the 90 
percent significance level when also excluding the recession period of the 1990s. Anyhow, 
there is quite a robust relationship between the time horizon of a minister of finance and the   – 25 –
soundness of public finances giving support to our argument in limiting the incentive to 
exploit the fiscal commons and in limiting the access to the fiscal commons for lobbies if the 
minister of finance remains in office for a long time-horizon.  
Many of the other control variables, also the economic variables, do not have a robust signifi-
cant effect on federal budget surpluses in percent of GDP with the important exception of in-
terest rates. A higher number of referenda and initiatives have a weakly significant negative 
effect on the budget surplus which could be the outcome of the asymmetric restriction direct 
democracy puts on the revenue side as compared to the spending side on the federal level.  
The results for the level of the public debt ratio, presented in the first three columns in Table 
5, contain some similarities to the surplus regressions, but also offer some interesting differ-
ences. Again the wars have a significant positive impact on debt. The devaluation in 1936 sig-
nificantly increased the debt to GDP ratio for the whole period and the two sub-periods. The 
same holds true for the level of interest rates. Also the number of seats of social democrats in 
parliament significantly reduces federal debt even though the effect vanishes if we exclude the 
war periods as well as the recession period. The same is true for social democratic finance mi-
nisters. For the whole time period, the switch to proportional representation has a significant 
positive effect on the level of debt to GDP which does however not hold for the sub-samples. 
Interestingly, the introduction of a federal income tax is positively associated with increases 
in the level of the federal debt ratio if we exclude the war-periods. The effect is significant at 
the 5 percent level and is also remarkable because the level of debt to GDP is stationary for 
that period. Thus, these estimations for the level of federal debt are particularly reliable.  
A closer look at the first differences of the federal debt to GDP ratio reveals largely similar re-
sults to the level estimations.
8 The wars, the devaluation of the Swiss franc and the level of 
interest rates significantly increase changes in debt to GDP. The only remarkable deviation 
between the regressions for the level and the change of debt is that the state old pension 
system proves to be significant for the first differences of federal debt to GDP without the war 
periods as well as the recession period in the 1990s. 
Table 6 presents the results for the error correction model of federal expenditure and revenue 
to GDP. The first three columns contain the results for the first differences in spending for the 
full sample and the two sub-periods, while columns (4) to (6) exhibit the respective results for 
the first differences of federal revenue. Given the cointegration relation between federal spen-  – 26 –
ding and revenue, it is most interesting that a significant short-run and long-run impact of re-
venue on expenditure is reported for the full sample, which is not matched by a similar effect 
of spending on revenue. That the revenue effects on spending vanish for the two sub-periods 
may be due to the much shorter time period. For the whole sample, these results provide 
support for the arguments by Peacock and Wiseman (1961) that the ability of a government to 
raise revenue is a precondition for an extension of public expenditure. In addition, the wars 
positively and significantly affect spending and revenue. Interest rates prove to be significant 
and positive in the spending ECM but not for revenue. Otherwise spending appears to be 
mainly determined by the dynamics between revenue and spending.  
In the case of revenue, additional interesting results show up. The oil price and the foundation 
of the SNB have marginally significant and negative effects on revenue. The introduction of 
proportional representation significantly increases revenue differences in the whole time 
period. Similarly, a higher number of referenda and initiatives significantly increase revenue. 
Both may indicate the ability of the government to raise revenue if the political procedures 
leading to higher taxation are perceived to be fair by the citizens. 
While political stability measured by the time horizon of the finance minister does not signifi-
cantly affect debt, government spending is significantly lower due to higher political stability 
also according to the results from the ECM. The same holds regarding the results of the level 
estimates in Table 7. Looking at the revenue ECM as well as the level estimates, the time 
horizon of a finance minister plays only a minor role. This is very much in line with the re-
sults in the deficit equation. Thus overall, we obtain evidence that political stability induces 
sound public finances by smaller government spending but only marginally smaller govern-
ment revenue. The general result supports other empirical evidence of the impact of govern-
ment stability on the exploitation of the public budget as a fiscal commons.  
5.  Conclusion 
In this paper, we have analyzed the impact of political stability on fiscal policy using time se-
ries for the Swiss federal level between 1849 and 2007. Theoretically, political stability, inter-
preted as a factually strong and successful finance minister who stays in office for a long time, 
may be a possibility to contain the fiscal commons problem of spending ministers exploiting 
the fiscal resources. Our estimation results are quite heterogeneous across the four budgetary 
                                                                                                                                                      
8.  It has to be noted that the first differences in federal debts and the levels in deficits are different since many 
off-budget activities are included in the federal debt statistics but not in the deficit statistics.   – 27 –
indicators, i.e. federal surplus, debt, expenditure and revenue, all normalized by GDP. For the 
federal budget surplus and for federal spending, we obtain evidence that a longer time horizon 
of the federal finance minister leads to sounder public finances by smaller government spen-
ding. However, federal revenue as well as federal debt are largely unaffected by government 
stability. In the case of government revenue, this is plausible while the results on debt stand in 
contrast to our predictions.  
Fiscal policy in Switzerland appears to be mainly driven by fiscal shocks such as the wars, but 
also by other events, like the devaluation of the Swiss franc by 30% in 1936. Of much impor-
tance are the dynamics between spending and revenue which provide support for the conten-
tion of Peacock and Wiseman (1961) that public spending increase if tax resistance wanes. Fi-
nally, some ideological effects can be found though not in the usually assumed direction. If 
social democrats have more seats in parliament this reduces deficits and debt. Although this 
might be the luck of a social democratic finance minister being in office during the consoli-
dation after the Second World War, it still adds to the doubts regarding ideological effects.  
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Appendix A 
Table A: Data description 
Variable name  Description  Source 
Expenditure  Federal expenditure divided by GDP  1950-2007: Swiss Federal Finance 
Administration, Swiss Federal Statistical 
Office 
1913-1949: Swiss Federal Department of 
Finance, Swiss Federal Statistical Office 
1849-1912: Walter von Burg (1916) 
Revenue  Federal revenue divided by GDP  1950-2007: Swiss Federal Finance 
Administration, Swiss Federal Statistical 
Office 
1913-1949: Swiss Federal Department of 
Finance, Swiss Federal Statistical Office 
1849-1912: Walter von Burg (1916) 
Surplus  Federal budget surplus divided by GDP  1950-2007: Swiss Federal Finance 
Administration, Swiss Federal Statistical 
Office 
1913-1949: Swiss Federal Department of 
Finance, Swiss Federal Statistical Office 
1849-1912: Walter von Burg (1916) 
Debts  Federal debts divided by GDP  1950-2007: Swiss Federal Finance 
Administration, Swiss Federal Statistical 
Office 
1913-1949: Swiss Federal Department of 
Finance, Swiss Federal Statistical Office 
1849-1912: Walter von Burg (1916) 
Oil Price  Crude oil price in US Dollars per barrel 
(in 2006 $) 
BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 
June 2007 
GDP  Real GDP, 1990=100  1851-1913: Historische Statistik der 
Schweiz, Cronos (1996) 
1914-1947: Andrist/ Anderson/ Williams: 
Real Output in Switzerland in Quarterly 
Review Federal Reserve Bank St.Louis, 
USA 
1948-2007: Bundesamt für Statistik, 
Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen 
(BFS) 
Population  Total Regular Population  Swiss Federal Statistical Office 
Wars  Dummy=1 for years with German-French 
War, World War I and World War II 
Own calculations 
Great Depression  Dummy=1 for years between 1929 and 
1933 
Own calculations 
Tax Amnesty  Dummy=1 for year with tax amnesty on 
the federal level (1940, 1945, 1969) 
Documentation of the Swiss Federal Tax 
Administration 
Existence SNB  Dummy=1 for years after the founding of 
the Swiss central bank SNB in 1907 
Die Schweizerische Nationalbank 1907-
2007, NZZ, Zürich 
Devaluation  Dummy=1 for year of the 30%-
devaluation of the Swiss currency in 1936 
Die Schweizerische Nationalbank 1907-
2007, NZZ, Zürich 
State Old Pension 
System (AHV) 
Dummy=1 for year after introduction of 
the Old Pension System AHV in 1948 
Own calculations   – 32 –
Proportional 
Representation 
Dummy=1 for years after introduction of 
proportional electoral system in 1919.  
Swiss Chancellerie 
Time Horizon of 
Finance Minister 
Number of years until the end of the term 
for the respective minister of finance 
Urs Altermatt (1991), Die Schweizer 
Bundesräte, Artemis and Winkler, Zürich 
Number of Referenda  Number of voter initiatives and public 
referenda in a year on the federal level 
Swiss Chancellerie 
Turnout  Average voter turnout of the voter 
initiatives and public referenda in a year 
on the federal level with 0 = no 
referendum or initiative was held 
Swiss Chancellerie 
Social democratic 
minister of finance 
Dummy=1 if the finance minister belongs 
to the social democratic party  
Swiss Chancellerie 
Social Democrats  Share of seats in the house of 
representatives held by members of the 
social democratic party 
1849-1918: Erich Gruner (1978): Die 
Wahlen in den Schweizerischen Nationalrat 
1848-1919, Francke Bern 
1919-2007: Swiss Federal Statistical Office 
Time trend  Time variable from 1849-2007  Own calculations 
Interest Rates  Bond yields, nominal, average of the year  1849 – 1898: Interest rates on savings 
deposits in Switzerland, regional average 
1899-2007: Yields on Swiss Confederation 
bonds 
DBST  Dummy=1 for year with a federal income 
tax in 1916, 1917, 1921, 1924, 1925, 
1928, 1929, 1932, 1940-2007 
Documentation of the Swiss Federal Tax 
Administration 
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Appendix B 
Table B: Descriptive statistics  
Variable Mean  Std.  Dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
Budget surplus divided by GDP  -0.005  0.019  -0.130  0.021 
Debt divided by GDP  0.146  0.137  0.001  0.632 
Revenue divided by GDP  0.060  0.034  0.016  0.142 
Expenditure divided by GDP  0.063  0.041  0.010  0.186 
Time trend  1928  46.044  1849  2007 
Wars 0.088  0.284  0  1 
Proportional representation 0.553  0.499  0  1 
Devaluation 0.006  0.079  0  1 
Existence SNB  0.635  0.4829  0  1 
Great depression  0.031  0.175  0  1 
Time horizon of finance minister  4.344  3.247  1  14 
Social-democratic minister  0.164  0.371  0  1 
Old age pension system  0.3774  0.486  0  1 
Oil price  25.210  18.515  8.665  104.354 
Population 4435557  153308  2392740  7508739 
GDP 77.206  131.749  0.659  504.167 
Tax amnesty  0.019  0.136  0  1 
DBST 0.478  0.501  0  1 
Nominal interest rates  4.047  0.865  2.106  7.118 
Voter turn-out  38.928  238427  0  80.509 
Ballots 1.862  1.536  0  9 
Share of social democrats  0.174  0.092  0  0.2887 
Note: 
For a detailed description of the variables see Appendix A. 
All statistics are computed for 159 observations. 
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Appendix C 
Table C: Head of Finance Ministry 
Term Name  Party  affiliation  citizenship 
1848/50  Martin Josef Munzinger  FDP  SO 
1851 Henry  Druey  FDP  VD 
1852  Martin Josef Munzinger  FDP  SO 
1853/54 Henry  Druey  FDP  VD 
1855/56  Melchior Josef Martin Knüsel  FDP  LU 
1857/58 Jakob  Stämpfli  FDP  BE 
1859/61 Constant  Fornerod  FDP  VD 
1862/63  Melchior Josef Martin Knüsel  FDP  LU 
1864/67 Jacques  Callet-Venel  FDP  GE 
1868 Victor  Ruffy  FDP  VD 
1869 Jacques  Callet-Venel  FDP  GE 
1870/71 Paul  Cérésole  FDP  VD 
1872 Karl  Schenk  FDP  BE 
1873  Johann Jakob Scherrer  FDP  ZH 
1874/75  Wilhelm Mathias Naeff  FDP  SG 
1876/78 Bernhard  Hammer  FDP  SO 
1879 Simeon  Bavier  FDP  GR 
1880/91 Bernhard  Hammer  FDP  SO 
1892/99 Walther  Hauser  FDP  ZH 
1900 Robert  Comtesse  FDP  NE 
1901/02 Walther  Hauser  FDP  ZH 
1903 Robert  Comtesse  FDP  NE 
1904 Marc-Emile  Ruchet  FDP  VD 
1905/09 Robert  Comtesse  FDP  NE 
1910  Josef Anton Schobinger  FDP  LU 
1911 Robert  Comtesse  FDP  NE 
1912/19 Giuseppe  Motta  CVP  TI 
1920/34 Jean-Mary  Musy  CVP  VD 
1935/38 Albert  Meyer  FDP  ZH 
1939/43 Ernst  Wetter  FDP  ZH 
1944/51 Ernst  Nobs  SP  ZH 
1952/54 Max  Weber  SP  ZH 
1954/59 Hans  Streuli  FDP  ZH 
1960/62 Jean  Bourgknecht  CVP  FR 
1963/68 Roger  Bonvin  CVP  VS 
1968/73 Nello  Celio  FDP  TI 
1974/79 Georges-André  Chevallaz  FDP  VD 
1980/83 Willi  Ritschard  SP  SO 
1984/95 Otto  Stich  SP  SO 
1996/03 Kaspar  Villiger  FDP  LU 
2004- Hans-Rudolf  Merz  FDP  AR 
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